Political responsibilities for systemic mass violence have been subordinated to the moral guilt and legal liability of perpetrators and collaborators, while the role of the bystander has been narrowly construed in terms of charitable rescue or negligence. This dominant victim-perpetrator framework ignores the complex political dimensions of bystander responsibilities for systemic mass violence, especially those responsibilities that stem from the benefits that bystanders receive. The films of Claude Lanzmann, Rithy Panh, and Yael Hersonski contain elements of an alternative framework of bystander responsibility and also can serve as catalysts for the political education of bystander beneficiaries and those from whom they have benefited.
Introduction
In Remembering to Forget: Holocaust Memory through the Camera's Eye, Barbie Zelizer argues that visual symbols of the Nazi Holocaust, such as emaciated prisoners standing helplessly behind barbed wire fences, pervade journalistic accounts of subsequent atrocities in the Balkans and Central Africa. These more recent images are stripped of vital identifying information and cropped to remind us of the Holocaust. 1 The result is a particular kind of amnesia: the viewer remembers to forget. That is, the photographs symbolically remind us of the past and we forget what they refer to concretely in the present. The effect of this atrocity aesthetic is political: "The media's use of images is inadvertently creating a breach between representation and responsibility." 2 By "remembering to forget" Zelizer believes we fail to acknowledge and act on our responsibilities in the present. 3 The symbols to which Zelizer calls attention do not just distract us from our present responsibilities. They reinforce a victim-perpetrator framework that subordinates the question of responsibility to one of individual legal liability and moral guilt, 4 while minimizing shared responsibility based upon political benefits. 5 The first goal of this essay is to re-frame bystander responsibility and its relationship to moral guilt and legal liability so that the political roles bystanders have played within the institutions and practices of mass violence, especially their roles as material and political beneficiaries, receive more theoretical attention. 6 While some bystanders in situations such as these provide indirect support to perpetrators and others risk their own lives for the sake of victims, a larger number of bystanders have been less visibly involved as beneficiaries, not contributors to or opponents of systemic mass violence. As Mark Drumbl 4 has observed, these bystanders benefit not just materially but also politically in terms of increased solidarity, purpose, and confidence. 7 The second goal of this essay is to suggest how the political responsibilities of bystanders can be made more visible to bystanders themselves and become the subject of a democratic political education that brings bystanders and those from whom they have benefited into political dialogue with one another. Hersonski that re-enact scenes from the Nazi Holocaust and the Cambodian genocide raise questions about the meaning and extent of bystander responsibility for the benefits that have continued to flow from these original acts of organized cruelty. Under the right interpretive light, these questions can then launch a longer process of engaged democratic political education.
The difference between guilt and responsibility, Iris Young has argued, is important for determining how we ought to respond politically to atrocities and other forms of systemic mass violence, but also to the "normal" structural injustices of our time such as the exploitation of sweatshop workers and the hyper-segregation of minority families in neighborhoods with dilapidated housing and poor schools. 9 I agree with Young that both forms of injustice ought to be addressed. However, as research suggests, systemic mass violence is not entirely abnormal.
In the societies in which it occurs, it depends upon institutions that have achieved a certain normalcy and ordinary persons who face extraordinary pressures.
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I begin where many discussions of this topic do, with Karl Jaspers ' The Question of German Guilt. 11 In this lecture, given in 1945 upon his return to Germany after the war, Jaspers addressed the question of to what extent, if any, should the German people, especially young people, feel guilty for the atrocities of the Nazi regime? We can begin to see how the concepts of 5 guilt and responsibility are related in the case of bystanders by examining the distinctions Jaspers draws between the four concepts of guilt in the German case and the responsibilities they do or do not entail.
Jaspers distinguished between criminal, moral, political, and metaphysical concepts of guilt. Criminal guilt, Jaspers asserts, refers to "acts capable of objective proof that violate unequivocal laws." Having defined criminal guilt, he quickly proceeds to the objections that the Nuremberg trials were based on neither objective proof nor unequivocal laws. Jaspers rebuts each of these objections in turn, 12 but his overarching defense of Nuremberg is more political. If the trial respects principles of individual criminal guilt "expressly defined in the statute of the International Military Tribunal," 13 then this institution will become accepted as part of a new worldwide legal order.
The answer to all arguments against the trial is that Nuremberg is something really new.
That the arguments point to possible dangers cannot be denied. But it is wrong, first, to think in sweeping alternatives, with flaws, mistakes and failings in detail leading at once to wholesale rejection, whereas the main point is the powers' trend of action, their unwavering patience in active responsibility. Contradictions in detail are to be overcome by acts designed to bring world order out of confusion.
14 In other words, there is a duty to prosecute in this case grounded not only on the criminal guilt of the defendants but on the forward-looking political responsibility of the victors to "bring world order out of confusion."
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Moral guilt is a different matter, but no less important to Jaspers. Feelings of moral guilt are prompted by moral conscience. 15 They will arise in a variety of ways, or at least they should according to Jaspers. In the context of Nazi Germany, the examples he cites are fairly noncontroversial to us now. They include our feelings of moral disapproval of dishonestly pledging allegiance to Nazi organizations, obeying immoral military orders simply because they are issued by a superior, partially approving and accommodating the actions of the Reich, remaining passive in the face of Nazism, and accepting professional or business opportunities by "running with the pack." 16 The last instance of moral guilt is especially relevant to the distinction between guilt and responsibility. In 1936 and 1937, Jaspers reminded his audience, the Nazi Party was the state and other states were appeasing Hitler. "A German who did not want to be out of everything" joined the Party." 17 Those who thought they would benefit in this way, one could argue, were morally responsible, even if they never had to follow immoral orders and even if they were never faced with a situation in which they stood by passively while others perpetrated a crime of war.
They "... went right on with their activities, undisturbed in their social life and amusements, as if nothing had happened." 18 This kind of insensitivity, as Larry May has argued, makes them morally responsible, not in an individual sense, but in a shared sense, no matter how much they knew. They performed no individual act of support for the Reich, but by participating in business and professional life, they kept the wheels of civil society moving and thereby fueled the war machine. 19 May's interpretation of Jaspers next concept, metaphysical guilt, is even more illuminating from the point of view of bystander responsibility. According to Jaspers, metaphysical guilt bears some resemblance to general survivor's guilt but it extends to our 7 membership in the human race as a whole. "Metaphysical guilt is the lack of absolute solidarity with the human being as such -an indelible claim beyond morally meaningful duty...if I survive where the other is killed, I know from a voice within myself: I am guilty of being still alive." 20 Feelings of metaphysical guilt are the result of the individual choice not to sacrifice one's own life, no matter how futile, for the life of a victim of systemic mass violence. These feelings depend upon membership in a community, and the community that Jaspers has in mind here is nothing short of humanity itself. Anyone, he says, should feel guilty if they survive the innocent victims of systemic violence. Jaspers was well aware of the danger of this formulation. "It would, indeed, be an evasion and a false excuse if we Germans tried to exculpate ourselves by pointing to the guilt of being human." 21 May attempts to rescue Jaspers' concept of metaphysical guilt from this reductio ad absurdum by connecting it to the existentialist notion of authenticity. 'Metaphysical guilt only entails moral responsibility, if by "moral responsibility" we mean responsibility for attitudes and character traits as well as responsibility for behavior. Inauthenticity involves a failure to see oneself as accountable for who one is; this is surely a failure of character, indeed a type of cowardice.'
Our feelings of metaphysical guilt are not to be dismissed as self-serving exculpatory confessions of original sin. Nevertheless, Jaspers comes very close to saying that everyone is a bystander to some form of systemic violence, and if this means that everyone who survives is morally responsible, conventional wisdom has it, then no one is. 22 Following Sartre, May qualifies this by saying that not everyone who fails to take responsibility for the groups he or she belongs to and which shape each member's character, is morally guilty. Sometimes these things cannot be changed. But we are all morally responsible, argues May, "for becoming consciously aware of their situations , for only when they are so 8 aware will it become possible to change for the better when change becomes possible." 23 Hitler's reign of terror." 24 To repeat, for those who are morally tainted by the behavior of a group they belong to, even though they did not participate in this behavior, they are morally responsible for "becoming consciously aware of their situation" so that when the opportunity arises they can act morally. 25 May does an excellent job expanding and improving Jasper's concepts of moral and metaphysical guilt so that their relationships to moral responsibility, including shared moral responsibility, are more plausible. However, he does not provide the same assistance when it comes to understanding the relationship between guilt and political responsibility. While the Nuremberg trials punished those who were legally guilty and exonerated the rest in a criminal sense, they did not address the political guilt of the German people. According to Jaspers, because they were "German nationals at the time the crimes were committed by the regime," the On the other hand, Jaspers claims that even recluses and others who stay out of politics are also politically liable because they enjoy the benefits of political order, pure and simple, if nothing else.
What does this notion of "political liability" mean? It could mean that citizens are liable for the damages that may be assessed against their state when it has harmed others. They are responsible, for example, for their fair share of war reparations as long as they either participated in the political process or benefited from the political order the state had once offered them. One could argue that this is a shared political responsibility whether one was an active citizen or a reclusive bystander. Merely benefiting from political order is sufficient to trigger this shared responsibility.
Looking back over Jaspers's lecture, it is striking how important the concept of responsibility is for his analysis of guilt. Criminal guilt rests upon a wider responsibility among the prosecuting parties to establish world order. One might say the moral and legal duty to prosecute is accompanied by a political responsibility to establish a new just world order to ensure that future prosecutions, if necessary, can be conducted. The moral guilt of those "running with the pack" entails a shared responsibility on their part to show more sensitivity to those who are the objects of discrimination and oppression. Most discussions of responsibilities for systemic mass violence emphasize the contributions which parties make, either through their causal actions or their failure to act. This is what the victim-perpetrator framework points us toward. At the same time, theorists may mention in passing the fact that some parties benefit from this violence. However, benefit responsibility, if it is mentioned, appears to be of secondary importance. 28 This is certainly true with regard to the responsibility of bystanders. Their failure to act is considered more important than any benefits they might involuntarily enjoy after the fact.
The following example illustrates how benefit responsibility can be a primary consideration for assessing the role of bystanders in systemic mass violence. In a How, then, can the responsibilities of bystanders in this stream of systemic mass violence be re-framed to call greater attention to their ongoing participation and the benefits they derive from it? To answer this question, I introduce the notion of critical reenactment.
Most reenactments are celebratory or investigative. The former can be parades or weekend campouts. 33 The latter can be entertaining or deadly serious, as was Errol Morris' film
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The Thin Blue Line (1988). While these two forms of reenactment may deal with guilt and responsibility, sometimes commemorating victims and prosecuting perpetrators, they are not critical in the sense in which I will use that term. Critical reenactments prompt the audience to adopt a more active, participatory role. They neither indict nor exonerate. In the language I have used to discuss guilt and responsibility for systemic mass violence, they avoid the victimperpetrator framework. Instead, they involve their viewers in critical self-reflection by presenting the bystander's predicament from different angles of vision.
Before working through these three examples of critical reenactment in more detail, two caveats are in order. First, together do they constitute a complete alternative framework for interpreting guilt and responsibility for systemic mass violence. They suggest a way of seeing the ways that bystanders participate in systemic mass violence other than either charitable rescuer or paralyzed observer. Second, separately they provide very different answers to exactly who is a bystander and how can they become more self-critical about their responsibilities. They do not turn everyone who is not a victim or perpetrator into a bystander beneficiary, but they do raise Panh is more concerned with empowering the viewer-as-bystander to paint a landscape on which victims and perpetrators may find common ground. The bystander in this case is encouraged to imagine a world in which victims and perpetrators speak more honestly with one another. The viewer-bystander is encouraged to be a facilitator, not a witness for the prosecution. Hersonski is more self-critical than either Lanzmann or Panh. The bystander she wishes to interrogate and educate is the person behind the camera who thinks she is not part of the scene she is filming.
She uses reenactment to disabuse this privileged bystander of her illusions that she has not contributed to and benefited from systemic mass violence.
Critical reenactments can be done through film or theatre, but they can also be composed on the web and written out as novels or poems. Bomba is about to describe how one of the barbers he is working with inside the gas chamber in Treblinka recognizes his wife and daughter among the women whose hair they are about to cut before they are executed. Bomba struggles to continue to retell the story, says he cannot, and him what was going to happen to them, we grow increasingly uncomfortable.
Lanzmann describes this scene in his memoir in great detail. He too was uncomfortable, and he claims that he realizes how controversial it is. To those who have accused Lanzmann of "sadism" he says: "Abraham's tears were as precious to me as blood, and the seal of truth, its very incarnation...this perilous scene was the epitome of reverence and supportiveness." 37 It is choreographed to awaken an awareness in the viewer of the "absolute" presence of the Holocaust. "One does not kill legends by opposing them with memories but by confronting them, if possible, in the inconceivable "present" in which they originated. The only way to do this is to resuscitate the past and make it present, invest it with a timeless immediacy." 38 According to one commentator sympathetic to Lanzmann's view of the "timeless immediacy" of the Holocaust, "By relying on the testimony of the participants, Lanzmann brought the past into the present -the eternal present, renewed in the act of existential recreation before the camera." by the Khmer Rouge. In the film it serves a dual purpose as both a stage for reenacting torture and executions and a site for re-educating former guards and torturers. It is a stage set for reenacting some of the original scenes of interrogation, torture, and execution, and it is also a setting for a new series of questions and answers between one of the survivors, Vann Nath, and several of his former guards, interrogators, and torturers.
The interrogators, torturers, and executioners in the film S21 walk through empty classrooms that had been converted into mass holding cells. The guards had been 12 or 13 years old at the time S21 was in operation. In the film S21 they awkwardly retrace their steps, slam metal doors, carry buckets and bowls, and repeat the orders and threats that they gave to the prisoners who had been lying side by side on the floor in these holding cells, dying of starvation.
Just as the survivors and former victims, collaborators, and bystanders in Shoah walk the fields and travel the train lines, so too do the survivors and guards in S21 retrace their original steps.
The adult former guards in S21 seem to remember their adolescent lines quite well, in part because they rehearse them (by reading the detailed Khmer Rouge records kept by the prison administrators) in front of the camera in small groups before actually reenacting them. Furthermore, Nath doesn't discuss his own role within the prison. As the official painter of Pol Pot portraits, we want to know if he enjoyed a relatively safer position -it appears that he did.
How did he feel about that? How did other prisoners interact with him?
We meet Nath in the film as he is painting a scene from memory of arrested prisoners handcuffed, blindfolded and strung together by a rope around their necks to be led up to their next destination point in S21. Unlike Bomba and the other sonderkommandos in Shoah, Nath at times was allowed to observe the scenes of torture and execution without contributing to them.
He was neither a bystander nor a contributor. In a sense, he was, like the cameramen that Hersonski investigates in A Film Unfinished, with one important difference. Nath was also a victim. This is one of the paintings that he made after his release for S21, reflecting the scenes of torture and execution he witnessed there. and several forms of temporality, in order to furnish us with a representation of the machine that shows us both how it could operate and how it is possible for the executioners and the victims to see it, think about it and feel about it today. 47 Rancière finds in S21 an example of political art that breaks free from the "trial-like" question of whether we should exhibit intolerable images -do they create a record or do they humiliate the humiliated yet again? "The images of art do not supply weapons for battles," Rancière argues. 
S21.
There is still a problem. The Khmer Rouge guards, in their 30s at the time of the filming, so easily imitate the thoughtless way in which they followed orders as adolescents that it is not at all difficult to imagine they could do it all over again. They show no more remorse than the property owners and churchgoers that Lanzmann hoped to provoke into a more self-critical dialogue. The "new landscape of the possible" resembles all too closely the old landscape of the unthinkable. Rancière, one fears, is overstating the transformative power of archival rearrangement. Yesterday's torturers may only be today's subordinate pupils as long as they are in class or in front of the camera. That doesn't mean that Panh's reenactment fails, but only that it may be the beginning of a process of democratic political education, not the end. Hersonski allows us to think more critically about the way in which the camera blinds some bystanders commissioned or forced to record systemic mass violence from seeing their own responsibilities clearly. It is not the cameraman caught unaware in this photograph that Hersonski is pointing toward, it is the cameraman taking this photograph who, like the one unaware in the photograph, does not think he or she, is visible.
A Film Unfinished
The blindness that comes from relying on "titles and clichés" is not the "inattention blindness" that can occur when monitoring a dynamic event. It is a different kind of attention deficit. We become so accustomed to the convenient truths about moral and legal responsibilities for civil war, slavery, genocide, and poverty that we no longer realize that we, like Wist, play a continuing role in their creation and legitimation. We too easily believe that because we are neither legally nor morally responsible, by default we must be innocent bystanders. However, according to Hersonski, those of us who record and disseminate these images are not innocent,
we are only invisible because we are positioned somewhere behind the camera.
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Ian Buruma is correct when he says that Hersonski is not saying "that Gaza is like the Warsaw ghetto and she does not suggest that Israeli behavior can be compared to Nazi mass
The fleeting moments when the cameramen caught themselves on film in A Film
Unfinished reveal more about their inhumanity and our own impassivity than the horrific scenes of suffering that have been reproduced using equally suspect Nazi documentaries. Hersonski cannot identify with the Holocaust as such, but sitting in her apartment she realizes that she too has been behind the camera filming scenes in the Israeli occupied territories. Just because she has not been filmed in the act doesn't mean she hasn't been there. And, unlike Vann Nath, there is much less doubt that she, like Wist, has not benefited from this opportunity to record the suffering of others. 
Conclusion
Many documentary films trace the path of tainted commodities and their illicit trade back to their source and forward to the final, sometimes naive consumer. These include commodities such as cotton, diamonds, drugs, food, firearms, human beings, and even human body parts sold illegally as transplant organs. 56 Many exposés reveal how the tax dollars of citizens from rich countries support activities such as the training of child soldiers by allied governments where it is contrary to the laws and treaty obligations of the governments of these rich countries. 57 Upon seeing these films and reading these reports, many viewers and readers are motivated to object to the abuses being done in their name. Organizations that support these films provide some ways, often quickly and easily through the Internet, to contribute money for aid and rescue, to lobby politicians, and to inform others. Some, like Invisible Children, are less reliable than others. 58 
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However, despite the concerted efforts to appeal to a sense of moral outrage and develop laws and regulations that curb these practices, systemic mass violence persists. 59 The premise of this essay has been that without more active political involvement by bystanders whose greatest sense of responsibility heretofore has been as charitable donors, it is hard to see how this tide can be stemmed. what Jane Addams once described as a "common road" with others from whom we may have benefited. Only then will we be able to see clearly the burdens that they continue to carry, and we will be in a much better position to imagine sharing in the benefits produced through their suffering. 63 This process of democratic political education is not a matter of reconciling victims and perpetrators. These films do not call for the establishment of quasi-judicial truth commissions anymore than they simply indict more collaborators. Their primary contribution is the conversation they open between bystander beneficiaries and those who have been harmed by systemic mass violence. Addams herself was adept at this form of interpretive democratic political education. 64 It is not an easy conversation to have, and watching these films by themselves is hardly enough. By re-framing the responsibilities of bystander beneficiaries in the various ways I have described, these three films can serve as openings for continued democratic political education led by citizen-teachers such as Addams and shared by bystander beneficiaries and those who have suffered under systemic mass violence. 65 There are no shortcuts on this road, and very few reliable maps. 66 
_________________________
That is another reason why the responsibilities of bystander beneficiaries are political. They can only be worked out one step at a time. 
